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My  remarks  like  those  of  most  speakers  are  preconditioned  by
certain beliefs, or perhaps  I should  say prejudices,  that  I hold.  I  am
centering my remarks around three of  those beliefs.  First, the most
important  issue  by  far  in  agricultural  trade  is  the  influence  of
domestic  agricultural  programs;  second,  this  can  be  seen  most
clearly  in  the  current  debate  between  the  United  States  and  the
European  Common  Market;  and  third,  the  ultimate  resolution  of
that  debate  may  set the  conditions  for agricultural  trade  for  many
decades  to come.  Please do not infer from  this that European  trade
is  all that  matters.  This is  far  from true.  But, the  manner  in which
we and the Common  Market  countries  resolve  the  conflict  between
domestic  agricultural  programs  and  trade  may  set  the  pattern  for
trade  among  all developed  economies.  Furthermore,  the  treatment
by the Common  Market of  its  former  territories  regarding  trade  in
tropical  products  and  its  position,  along  with  that  of  the  United
States,  on food aid to developing nations may set the pattern in this
regard for  the entire  world.
I  have  one  other  prejudice  that should  be  called  to your  atten-
tion.  Underlying  my  remarks,  particularly  those  toward  the  close
of  the  paper,  is  a  belief  that  a  successful  Common  Market  is  of
general economic  and political value  to the United States.  Although
we  have  no  assurance  that  the  ultimate  destiny  of  the  Common
Market  will be success  in this  sense,  we  also  do  not have  sufficient
cause  to  give  up  hope.
THE  IMPORTANCE  OF  GOVERNMENT  PROGRAMS
Until we  reach  the  millennium  when  world-wide  free  trade  is
a reality,  government  will always  be  a potent  force  in  determining
both the volume and  the  terms  of trade.  But,  in modern  developed
economies  the  actions  of  government  insofar  as  agricultural  trade
is  concerned  have  become  less  and  less  a  matter  of  direct  trade
policy  determination  and  more  and  more  an  indirect  result  of
domestic  price  policy  determination.  As  I  will  discuss  in  greater
detail  later,  this  is the  fact that  makes  the  inclusion  of  agriculture
in  the  Trade  Expansion  talks  at  GATT  (General  Agreement  on
Tariffs  and Trade)  such  a  difficult  problem.
In the  United  States  we  seem  very  prone  to  ignore  the  role  of
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and imports.  For the moment  let  us  talk  about  exports.  Each  time
I  read  a  report  citing  a new  record  volume  of  agricultural  exports
by the United  States  I  feel  a  strong  desire  to  write  a  letter  to  the
editor  asking  him  to  give  credit  where  credit  is  due.  The  official
USDA  reports  are  far  better  in  this  regard  than  they  were  a  few
years  ago,  but  the  glowing  reports  issued  by  the  trade  and  those
generally published in the popular  press fail to recognize  adequately
the role of government  in the total trade process.  In the year ending
June  30,  1962,  for  example,  we  exported  5.1  billion  dollars  of  agri-
cultural  goods.  Of  this  total  1.6  billion  dollars,  or  32  percent,  was
financed under  special government  programs, primarily  Public  Law
480.  An  additional  20  percent  of  these  sales  were  made  possible
through  export  payments.  If  we  were  to check  the  records  closely
we would  find that most  of the remaining  sales  were  influenced  in
some indirect fashion  by government.  Let me cite  just one  example.
We  have read  a little in the  papers  recently  about  our  poultry
sales  to  Germany.  The  development  of  that  trade  is  a  fascinating
story.  It began in  1956 with  a  small Title  I,  P.  L.  480,  transaction.
The  trade  on  both  sides  was  reluctant  to  take  the  risks  associated
with  opening  this  market.  Even  with  the  P.  L.  480  provisions  the
pump had to be primed with a freight subsidy.  Since that initial con-
tract  all  sales  have  been  for  dollars  and  without  subsidy.  Thanks
in  part  to  a  strong  market  development  effort  financed  and  pro-
moted  largely  by  government  in  cooperation  with  the  trade,  this
market  has  grown  to  the  point  where  we  exported  more  than  50
million  dollars  of poultry  to  Germany  in  1961.  What  share  of  the
credit  for  this  success  goes  to  government  and what  share  belongs
to the trade is  anybody's  guess.  But nobody should  claim that either
deserves  all  the  credit.
The governmental influence on agricultural trade is not restricted
to the  exporting  side.  A variety  of  devices,  including  import  levies,
skimming  charges,  quotas,  health  and  sanitation  regulations,  etc.,
have  been  employed  by  importing  countries.  The  effects  of  these
measures  on the volume and terms  of trade must at least  equal  the
effects  of subsidies  and other devices  employed by exporters.  In this
connection  our  attention  all  to  often  is  focused  on  tariffs.  As  a
matter  of  fact,  recent  studies  in  GATT  and  elsewhere  reveal  that
nontariff barriers  have been  a far more important  factor where  agri-
culture is  concerned. We in the United States certainly cannot claim
to be innocent in this  regard.
Let me call your attention  to one  more  point, the often misused
and  poorly  conceived  idea  of  "world  price."  We  frequently
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in world  markets  because  domestic  prices  are  above  world  prices.
Certainly  this  is  true  if  we  think  of  world  prices  as  the  price  at
which  goods  exchange  in  world  trade.  All  too  often,  however,  the
term "world price'  is  used as  if  it  implies  some  sort  of  free-market
equilibrium  price  determined  in  a world-wide  market  where  goods
and factors move freely  in response  to economic conditions.  I  doubt
if  any major  agricultural  commodity  entering  world  trade  is  mar-
keted under  conditions  even  remotely  resembling  such  a  situation.
The  world  price  of  wheat  today,  for  example,  is  quite  largely  a
function  of  the  size  of  the  subsidy  paid  by  exporters,  the  levies
charged  by  importers,  levels  of  domestic  price  support,  degrees  of
production  control,  and the conditions  imposed  by the  International
Wheat  Agreement.  Incidentally,  I  consider  the  latter  far  less  sig-
nificant  than  is  often claimed  since  it was  largely  superimposed  on
the  domestic  support  programs  that  preceded  it.  Few  domestic
policies  have  been  forced  to  change  in  order  to  accommodate  the
conditions  of the  IWA.
I  do  not know  whether  the  so-called  "free-market  world  price"
of wheat  is  above  or  below  the  figure  at which  wheat  currently  is
being traded.  I am really not even  certain that whether  we do know
this  makes  any  difference.  But  if the  present  trading price  is  even
close  to such  a price,  it  is purely  coincidence.
This,  then,  establishes  the  major  theme  of  my  paper.  World
trade  in  agricultural  commodities  has  not  been  determined  strictly
by  economic  factors.  It  will  not  be  determined  largely  by  such
factors  for a long time.  In the developing  countries,  export  and  im-
port programs  to  facilitate  economic  development  and  to  regulate
precarious  balance-of-payments  situations  will  continue  to  exist.
This will be so even if food aid programs  such  as our P.  L.  480 pro-
gram should  be terminated;  and  I do not  expect  that to happen.  In
developed  countries  relatively  low levels  of  agricultural  prices  and
incomes will continue  to constitute  a major  domestic  economic  and
political problem.  No  government  in  the developed  world  appears
willing  or  able  to  forego  support  programs  designed  to  alleviate
these problems.  Yet,  such  programs  are  inherently  in conflict  with
the  generally  expressed  desire  for  freer  trade.  Despite  this  fact,
seldom  has  any  serious  attempt  been  made  to  reduce  this  conflict
in the development  of farm  programs.
Two of the most crucial problems  facing agricultural  economists
as  researchers  and as  educators  in the decade  ahead  relate  directly
to these points. One is the problem of gaining a better understanding
of  the  role  of  food  in  economic  development.  This  includes  both
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programs.  The second  problem  is  how to  develop  domestic  agricul-
tural programs in the developed  countries that are in some sense  less
in conflict  with the generally  expressed  desires for  freer trade.
The two  problems  are  related.  For  example,  we  cannot  realisti-
cally  separate  the  issue  of  food  aid  from  that  of  domestic  agricul-
tural  programs.  However,  for  our  purposes  today  I  intend  to  talk
primarily  about the  issues  relating to  trade  in  the  developed  coun-
tries.  This  implies  that  we  are  going  to  be  referring  primarily  to
temperate  zone  or  semi-tropical  agricultural  products.
THE  U.  S. - COMMON  MARKET  DEBATE
The  second  belief  I  cited  earlier  was  that  the  influence  of
domestic  agricultural  programs  can  be  seen  most  clearly  in  our
current debate with the  Common Market.  Let me develop this point
somewhat,  although  I  am  sure  we  all  recognize  that  anything  I
might  say would  be all too  brief  to cover  the topic properly.
The most significant feature  of the debate and,  I believe,  the one
least well  accepted  by  the  American  public,  is  that both  sides face
the  same  fundamental  economic,  social,  and  political  problems  in
the  agricultural  sector.  In  each  case  that  broad  problem  is  coping
with a situation where  agricultural productive  capacity is  expanding
more rapidly than needs.  Because of the failure or inability  to adjust
resources  adequately,  agricultural  incomes  tend  to fall  below  those
in the  rest of society.  In the  absence  of government  programs,  agri-
cultural incomes  would lag behind those of their urban neighbors to
a  still greater  degree than in  the  recent  past.
Surprisingly  enough,  when  viewed  in broad terms  the  Common
Market  and  the  United  States  are  attempting  to  solve  their  agri-
cultural  difficulties,  or  perhaps  we  should  sav  alleviate their  price
and income  difficulties, in much the same fashion also. In both areas,
direct  market  intervention  is  limited  primarily  to  major  crops.  In
both  areas  incomes  are  supported  by  supporting  prices.  In  both
areas  the  desired  level of prices  for supported  commodities  will be
achieved  by restricting  quantities  flowing  through  the market.  This
last  point  is  where  the  Common  Market  program  deviates  sig-
nificantly from that in the  United States.  As  an exporting  nation, we
in  the  United  States  have  been  forced  to  control  marketings  by  a
variety of programs  including:  loan and storage,  production  control,
and  restrictions  on  imports.  The  Common  Market,  however,  is  an
importing  area  for  many  commodities  and  particularly  for  grains.
As  a  result,  it can  achieve  the  necessary  restriction  on  marketings
for the most  part simply  by regulating  imports,  and  this  is  what  is
intended.  In other  words,  the Common  Market  also  is  operating  a
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ment  are  felt primarily  by  producers  outside  the  Common  Market
countries.
Analysis  of the  Common  Market  agricultural  policy  situation  is
particularly  complicated  because  of  the  transitional  nature  of  the
market  at  the  present  time.  We  are  dealing  not  with  one  strong
central  government  but  with  a  relatively  weak  central  political
organization  and  six  equally  powerful,  insofar  as  voting  is  con-
cerned,  individual  states.  Thus,  compromises  on  important  issues
are  very  difficult  to  achieve.  Furthermore,  interpretation  of  state-
ments  by  members  of  the  Common  Market  Commission  must  be
tempered  by  realistic  appraisal  of  the political  situation  in  each  of
the  member  countries.  One  thing  seems  certain,  however.  The
variable  levy  system  of  price  supports  and  supply  management  is
here  to  stay. The  difficulties  associated  with  gaining  acceptance  of
this  system  were  so  great  that  the  Common  Market  nations  are
unlikely  to  discard  it  in  favor  of  an  alternative,  regardless  of  the
feelings  of  third countries  such  as  the  United  States.
The true impact  of the variable  levy  system  on imports  of  agri-
cultural  commodities  will not  be  known for  some  years.  Even  pro-
jections  are  difficult to  make because  of the  failure  to set the  price
level  toward which grain policy  will  be  directed.  This  decision  un-
doubtedly  is  the  most  important  single  factor  in  determining  the
total level of protection  and income  support that  is  to be  provided
to  farmers  of  the  community.
But  insofar  as  our  discussion  today  is  concerned,  one  issue  is
clear.  The  Common  Market  does  intend  to  protect  its  agriculture
to at least as great  a degree  as we in the United  States. Also,  for the
most part,  it is going to do  this through  actions taken  at the  border
wherever  feasible.  Laying  aside  for  the  moment  the  question  of
whether  the  Common  Market  policies  are  more  or  less  restrictive
than the individual country policies that preceded  it, it is abundantly
clear  that  the  generally  expressed  desire  for  freer  trade  among
nations  has  not been  a major  influence  in  the determination  of the
domestic  agricultural  policies  of  the  community.  I  suppose  that  in
all  fairness  we  should  add  that  it  has  had  little  influence  in  the
determination  of our  own  agricultural  policies  also.
POSSIBLE  OUTCOMES
This  brings  us  to  the  third  of  the  major  beliefs  I  cited  at  the
beginning.  The  ultimate  resolution  of  the  U.  S.-Common  Market
debate may determine the conditions for agricultural trade for many
decades  to  come.
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down.  Armed  with  increased  negotiating  power  provided  by  the
Trade  Expansion  Act  we  have  entered  the  preliminary  skirmishes
of the  upcoming  GATT  negotiations  determined  to  gain  something
for American  agriculture.  Attached to our  initial offer of  50 percent
linear cuts in tariffs was the condition  that agricultural commodities
must  be  included  in  the  negotiations.  While  many  people  in  the
Common  Market  have  reacted  sympathetically  to  our  position,  the
only  concrete  result  has  been  establishment  of  several  commodity
committees  under the auspices  of GATT  to explore  the  possibilities
for world-wide  agreements.  At the same time, because  the Common
Market  failed  to  respond  favorably  to  our  request  for  a  reduction
in poultry levies,  we have initiated  action  to retaliate through  tariff
increases on certain imports  of particular  sensitivity  to the Common
Market.
What interpretation  are  we  to place  on these  events?  Does  our
retaliatory  threat represent  the start  of a  massive trade  war?  Is  the
Common  Market  bluffing  simply  to  find  out  how  far  we  will  go?
The  situation resembles to  a frightening  degree the  "chicken"  game
teen  agers  are  supposed  to  play  with  automobiles.  We  and  the
Common  Market  are  straddling  the  white  line  and  are  rapidly
approaching  the point of impact.  Possibly  we both are so committed
to  positions  that  we  fear  the  loss  of  face  resulting  from  a  retreat
more  than we  fear  the  collision.  I  would  hope  that this  is  not  the
case.  Let us  look at the particulars a  little more  closely.
As I mentioned  earlier,  the basic policy problems  in  Europe  are
essentially  the  same  as  those  in  the  U.  S.  Unfortunately  the  com-
modity that is most sensitive  politically to the Common Market  also
is  one  of  the most  important  from  the  standpoint  of  American  ex-
ports.  I  refer,  of  course,  to  grains.  By  insisting  that  the  Common
Market  adopt  a policy  that guarantees  access  for  American  grains,
we are forcing the  European politicians  to choose  between  pressure
from us or from their own grain producers.  Given the fact that grains
are  produced  in  every  section  of  every  Common  Market  country,
what  choice  do  you  think  they  will make?  To  help  you  reach  an
answer,  consider  the choice we would make  if the Common  Market
insists that we give up our policy of import quotas on dairy products.
Are  we  willing  to  let  this  impasse  over  trade  in  agricultural
commodities  prevent  us  and the world  from benefiting  from  a  con-
tinuation  of  the trend  toward  freer  trade  in  other  commodities?  I
hope  not.  However,  the argument  often  followed  is  that  if we  give
in  and  allow  the  protectionist  tendencies  in  European  agriculture
to win  out, are we  not allowing,  and in a sense  condoning,  a whole
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cultural protectionism  certainly  is not new. The fact that we  openly
accept  it for  certain  key  commodities  that  are  especially  sensitive
politically  does  not mean that we need  accept it for all  agricultural
commodities.  Is  it not possible  that the Kennedy  round  could  lead
to a significant reduction in protectionism outside  the grain-livestock
sector?  Is it not possible  that we might make  some progress  toward
a  real  reduction  in  tariff  and  nontariff  barriers  in  the  politically
less  sensitive  commodities?  I think  it  is. But we  must keep  in mind
that  we  also  have  some  adjusting  to  do  on  this  score.
If my  logic has been  clear,  you will  see that  I have reached  the
point  where  I  accept,  not  by choice  but by  necessity,  agricultural
protectionism  for  certain  commodities  of  crucial  importance  to  the
success  of  agricultural  price  and  income  support  programs.  In  this
group  are  the  commodities  of  the  grain-livestock  sector  including
dairy  and,  as  far  as  the  U.  S.  is  concerned,  probably  cotton  and
tobacco  as well. My acceptance  is based on the fact  that none of the
developed  countries  appear  to  be  willing  or  able  to  give  up  price
and  income  support  programs.
This  begs  the  question,  will  this  condition  continue  forever?
It might  but I  hope it will not.  The  U.  S.-Common  Market  debate
might be the catalyst that finally forces  us to recognize the universal
nature  of  agricultural  price  and  income  problems  in  developed
countries.  Following this recognition  should come  a realization  that
policies  generated  in  individual  countries  and  designed  to  protect
selfish interests  will not  resolve these problems.  In other  words,  we
may be approaching  a time  when domestic agricultural  policies  will
be  developed within  a  framework  established,  in part,  by  interna-
tional consultation  and deliberation.
This  idea  is  not  new.  For  example,  we  have  heard  arguments
for some  time that surplus  disposal should be  handled  by an  inter-
national group.  FAO  proposed  a  set of  general  guidelines  for agri-
cultural  price  and  income  policies  many  years  ago.  However,  the
idea  of  international  restraints  on  domestic  policy  making  has  not
been given serious  consideration until recently.  Now  even  Secretary
Freeman has stated that in order to reach a satisfactory  accord  with
the  Common  Market  we  are  willing  to  place  our  own  domestic
policies  in the negotiating  pot.
The form that such a radical change in agricultural policy making
might  take  is  very much  in doubt.  The  popular fad  of  the moment
is  international  commodity  agreements.  I doubt,  however,  if we  or
the Common  Market  are prepared  to  accept  the sort  of  conditions
an  effective  agreement  would  require.  A  more  realistic  approach
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tively  broad  discretionary  powers  resting with  the  individual  state
at  first.  Over  time  the  range  within  which  each  country  may  set
support prices, production  controls,  and surplus disposal  procedures
would  be  expected  to  become  increasingly  narrow.
CONCLUSION
The success  of the Trade  Expansion Act which represents  one of
our  most  important  steps  toward  an  Atlantic  Community  and  a
better  world  depends  upon  a  well-informed  American  public.  Its
basic  premise  is that we  are willing to  lose  on some  commodities  in
order  to  gain  on  others.  If  the  Trade  Expansion  Act  is  to  be  im-
plemented effectively, our leaders must have the courage to override
the pleas  of  selfish interest  groups when  such  action  is  required  in
the national  interest.  It  is  unfortunate  and  perhaps  unsound  from
an economic  standpoint that agriculture may  lose  most in the initial
negotiations.  But it may  be far  better that agriculture  accept  some
losses  than  that  we  all  lose  the  long-run  political  and  economic
benefits  of a true Atlantic Community.
During  the  coming  year  American  policy  makers  must  make
some  important  decisions.  Many  of  these  decisions  relate  directly
to  agriculture,  but  the  ultimate  choice  may  determine  the  future
course  of Free  World  relations  in  all  spheres.  Our  profession,  and
especially  this  group within  the profession, bears  a major  responsi-
bility for helping the American  people  see  the issues  involved more
clearly.  The challenges  are  great and the time  is short.  But perhaps
we  can help prevent  future  historians  from  citing  1964  as  the  year
that the dreams  of an Atlantic  Community  were  shattered.
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